



# **CIP 201: Security Patch Management**

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**June 17, 2024**

# Antitrust Admonition

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# Upcoming Sessions

June 3 – History and Introduction to Texas RE

June 4 – Registration & Certification

June 5 – Intro to Align

June 6 – Risk-Based Approach to Reliability

June 10 – Foundations of CIP Programs

June 11 – Foundations of O&P Programs

June 12 – Navigating Noncompliance Resolutions

June 13 – NERC Data Collection, Events Analysis, and Guidelines

June 17 – Reliability 201: Security Patch Management
















June 18 – Reliability 201: O&P

June 24 – Reliability 201: CMEP Feedback Loop

June 25 – Reliability 201: Compliance in Align Walkthrough

June 25 – Reliability 201: Reliability Services

# JUNE 2024

| SUN | MON   | TUE   | WED   | THU   | FRI | SAT |
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# **Cyber and Physical Security Workshop**


## **August 28, 2024**

# Upcoming ERO Enterprise Events



**May - July, 2024**

GADS Wind & Solar Template  
and Application Training



**June 27, 2024**

Regional Summer Assessment  
Webinar



**July 16-18, 2024**

Physical Security Workshop





slido

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# Agenda



CIP-007-6 R2



Topics of Consideration



Examples



Resources



# Why We Are Here

## Continued risk from software and hardware vulnerabilities

- Vulnerabilities in the network equipment that protects BES Cyber Assets
- Other recent events include, MoveIT, Log4J, and SolarWinds






## Why We Are Here (Cont.)

### CIP Noncompliance Reported in 2023


- The most frequently reported noncompliance involving CIP standards
- CIP-007 holds top spot
- Standards that involve high volume and high frequency conduct




# CIP-007-6 Cyber Security—Systems Security Management

## Purpose

To manage system security by specifying select technical, operational, and procedural requirements in support of protecting BES Cyber Systems against compromise that could lead to misoperation or instability in the Bulk Electric System (BES)



# CIP-007-6 Requirement 2





## Slido Question

**What are some issues that can occur due to poor security patch management?**



# CIP-007-6 Requirement 2 (Cont.)

## Applicable Systems

**High Impact  
BES Cyber  
Systems and their  
associated:**

- EACMS;
- PACS; and
- PCA

**Medium Impact  
BES Cyber  
Systems and their  
associated:**

- EACMS;
- PACS; and
- PCA



## CIP-007-6 Part 2.1

A patch management process for tracking, evaluating, and installing cybersecurity patches for applicable Cyber Assets

The tracking portion shall include the identification of a source, or sources used for tracking

## Cybersecurity Patches

### Are:

- Patches that address a specific vulnerability in a hardware or software product

### Are Not:

- Patches regarding functionality without a cybersecurity impact
- Patches that apply to a service or component that is not installed or enabled





## Examples of Evidence

- Patch management Process
- List of monitored sources
  - BES Cyber System; or
  - BES Cyber Asset



### Considerations

- Does your process language include detailed Instructions?
- How is compliance documentation stored?
- Does your process include controls to track applicable Cyber Assets?



# CIP-007-6 Part 2.2

## Requirement

At least once every 35 calendar days, **evaluate** security patches for applicability that have been released since the last evaluation from the **source or sources** identified in Part 2.1

## Considerations

- Controls around requirement deadlines
- What is your process to verify the end date of the evaluation?

## Examples of Evidence

An evaluation conducted by, referenced by, or on behalf of a Responsible Entity of security-related patches released by the document sources at least once every 35 calendar days





## CIP-007-6 Part 2.3

For applicable patches identified in Part 2.2, within 35 calendar days of the evaluation completion take one of the following actions:

- Apply the applicable patches
- Create a dated mitigation plan
- Revise an existing mitigation plan

Mitigation plans shall include the planned actions to mitigate the vulnerabilities addressed by each security patch and a timeframe to complete the mitigations



## CIP-007-6 Part 2.3 (Cont.)

### Example evidence

- Records of the installation of the patch; or
- A dated plan showing when and how the vulnerability will be addressed.

### Considerations

- How do you verify the installation date of patches?
- What controls are in place to verify the patch was installed?
- Do your Mitigation plan's actions address the vulnerabilities?



## CIP-007-6 Part 2.4

For each mitigation plan created or revised in Part 2.3, implement the plan within the timeframe specified in the plan, unless a revision to the plan or an extension to the timeframe specified in Part 2.3 is approved by the CIP Senior Manager or delegate.





## CIP-007-6 Part 2.4 (Cont.)

### Example evidence

- Records demonstrating mitigation plans were implemented
- Records demonstrating that a revision or extension specified in part 2.3 was approved by the CIP Senior Manager or their delegate



### Topics of Consideration

- How are mitigation plan deadlines tracked?
- How is implementation evidence of mitigation plans stored?
- Do you have a process to ensure mitigation plan(s) are approved by the CIP Senior Manager or their delegate?




## Slido Question

**What are some tools that can help achieve compliance with CIP-007-6 R2?**



# CIP-007-6 R2—Example

| Cybersecurity Patch Tracking   |
|--|
| BES Cyber System/BES Cyber Asset: Cyber Asset Index ID 1, 5, 6, 8, 9 |
| Vendor: Network Equipment Vendor                                     |
| Software/Hardware Product: Firewall 9000                             |
| Software/Firmware Version: Firewall OS v1.1                          |
| Source: www[.]networkdevices[.]com/downloads/firewall9000            |
| Notes:   |

| Cybersecurity Patch Management  |
|---|
| Ticket Number: 23-0001  |
| Date: 5/08/2024   |
| Cybersecurity Patch Information: A cross-site scripting vulnerability exists in the web based configuration utility.                                  |
| Impacted BES Cyber Assets: Cyber Asset Index ID 1, 5, 6, 8, and 9   |
| Evaluation: Patch addresses vulnerability in the web based configuration utility used to manage Cyber Asset Index ID 1, 5, 6, 8, and 9.               |
| Date of Evaluation: 5/18/2024   |
| Installation: Dated screenshot demonstrating patch was installed.  |
| Installation Date: 6/02/2024  |
| Notes:  |

Install.png






# CIP-007-6 R2—Example (Cont.)

| Cybersecurity Patch Management   |
|--|
| <b>Ticket Number:</b> 23-0002  |
| <b>Date:</b> 7/10/2023   |
| <b>Cybersecurity Patch Information:</b> Remote Code Execution vulnerability that may allow a remote unauthenticated attacker to execute code on Cyber Assets Running OS Version v10.1. |
| <b>Impacted BES Cyber Assets:</b> BES Cyber Asset Index ID 15, 23, 32, 45.   |
| <b>Evaluation:</b> Completed, patch is an applicable cybersecurity patch to address remote code execution.   |
| <b>Date of Evaluation:</b> 7/15/2023   |
| <b>Installation:</b> Patch will not be installed due to impact on reliability. Mitigation Plan will need to be created.  |
| <b>Installation Date:</b> N/A  |
| <b>Rollback Plan:</b> N/A  |

| Mitigation Plan   |
|---|
| <b>Ticket Number:</b> 23-0002   |
| <b>Date:</b> 8/02/2023  |
| <b>Mitigation Plan Information:</b> Mitigation plan for OS vulnerability impacting four BES Cyber Assets.   |
| <b>Impacted BES Cyber Assets:</b> BES Cyber Asset Index ID 15, 23, 32, 45   |
| <b>Planned Actions to Mitigate Vulnerabilities:</b> Impacted Cyber Assets will be isolated from the rest of the network via the creation of VLANs, additionally we will limit access to the VLAN by limiting the number of Cyber Assets that are able to communicate to the created VLAN. |
| <b>Timeframe to Complete Mitigations:</b> 5 calendar days. To complete by 8/15/2023.  |
| <b>Revision/Extension:</b> N/A  |
| <b>Approval by CIP Senior Manager or Delegate:</b> N/A  |



# CIP-007-6 Requirement 2 Recap



# Implementation Resources

## CIP Evidence Request Tool

| Standard  | Requirement  | Initial Evidence Request Required in RSAW and NERC Evidence Request Spreadsheet   |
|-----------|--|---|
| CIP-007-6 | R2   | Provide each documented process that collectively includes each of the applicable requirement parts in CIP-007 R2. For each applicable Cyber Asset that is updateable and for which a patching source exists, include the identification of a source or sources that are tracked for the release of cyber security patches.   |
| CIP-007-6 | R2 Part 2.1<br>R2 Part 2.2<br>R2 Part 2.3<br>R2 Part 2.4 | For each Cyber Asset in Sample Set CA-L2-10, for the dates in Sample Set SS-DATE-04, provide:<br>1. For each cyber security patch released for each sampled Cyber Asset:<br>a) The release date of the patch;<br>b) The date of evaluation of the patch;<br>c) If the patch is applied, the date and evidence of application;<br>d) If the patch is the subject of a mitigation plan, provide the mitigation plan and any revisions.<br>2. For instances of no released patches, provide evidence evaluations were completed at least every 35 calendar days. |

## NIST SP 800-53, Rev. 5

NIST SP 800-53, REV. 5

SECURITY AND PRIVACY CONTROLS FOR INFORMATION SYSTEMS AND ORGANIZATIONS

### SI-2 FLAW REMEDIATION

#### Control:

- Identify, report, and correct system flaws;
- Test software and firmware updates related to flaw remediation for effectiveness and potential side effects before installation;
- Install security-relevant software and firmware updates within [Assignment: organization-defined time period] of the release of the updates; and
- Incorporate flaw remediation into the organizational configuration management process.

Discussion: The need to remediate system flaws applies to all types of software and firmware. Organizations identify systems affected by software flaws, including potential vulnerabilities resulting from those flaws, and report this information to designated organizational personnel with information security and privacy responsibilities. Security-relevant updates include patches, service packs, and malicious code signatures. Organizations also address flaws discovered during assessments, continuous monitoring, incident response activities, and system error handling. By incorporating flaw remediation into configuration management processes, required remediation actions can be tracked and verified.

Organization-defined time periods for updating security-relevant software and firmware may vary based on a variety of risk factors, including the security category of the system, the criticality of the update (i.e., severity of the vulnerability related to the discovered flaw), the organizational risk tolerance, the mission supported by the system, or the threat environment. Some types of flaw remediation may require more testing than other types. Organizations determine the type of testing needed for the specific type of flaw remediation activity under consideration and the types of changes that are to be configuration-managed. In some situations, organizations may determine that the testing of software or firmware updates is not necessary or practical, such as when implementing simple malicious code signature updates. In testing decisions, organizations consider whether security-relevant software or firmware updates are obtained from authorized sources with appropriate digital signatures.

## Implementation Resources (Cont.)

# NIST SP 800-53, Rev. 5

### SI-2 Flaw Remediation

- Review “Related Controls.”

### CA-5 Plan of Action & Milestones

- “Track planned remedial actions.”


### CM-3 Configuration Change Control

- “Configuration change control for organizational systems involves the systematic proposal, justification, implementation, testing, review, and disposition of system changes, including system upgrades and modifications.”





# Pyramid of Pain



## TTPs

- Tough

## Tools

- Challenging

## Network/Host Artifacts

- Annoying

## Domain Names

- Simple

## IP Addresses

- Easy

## Hash Values

- Trivial

# MITRE ATT&CK® for Industrial Control Systems

| Initial Access                      | Execution                 | Persistence            | Privilege Escalation                  | Evasion                   | Discovery                           | Lateral Movement                | Collection                         | Command and Control                 | Inhibit Response Function     | Impair Process Control       | Impact                           |
|-------------------------------------|---------------------------|------------------------|---------------------------------------|---------------------------|-------------------------------------|---------------------------------|------------------------------------|-------------------------------------|-------------------------------|------------------------------|----------------------------------|
| 12 techniques                       | 9 techniques              | 6 techniques           | 2 techniques                          | 6 techniques              | 5 techniques                        | 7 techniques                    | 11 techniques                      | 3 techniques                        | 14 techniques                 | 5 techniques                 | 12 techniques                    |
| Drive-by Compromise                 | Change Operating Mode     | Hardcoded Credentials  | Exploitation for Privilege Escalation | Change Operating Mode     | Network Connection Enumeration      | Default Credentials             | Adversary-in-the-Middle            | Commonly Used Port                  | Activate Firmware Update Mode | Brute Force I/O              | Damage to Property               |
| Exploit Public-Facing Application   | Command-Line Interface    | Modify Program         | Hooking                               | Exploitation for Evasion  | Network Sniffing                    | Exploitation of Remote Services | Automated Collection               | Connection Proxy                    | Alarm Suppression             | Modify Parameter             | Denial of Control                |
| Exploitation of Remote Services     | Execution through API     | Module Firmware        |                                       | Indicator Removal on Host | Remote System Discovery             | Hardcoded Credentials           | Data from Information Repositories | Standard Application Layer Protocol | Block Command Message         | Module Firmware              | Denial of View                   |
| External Remote Services            | Graphical User Interface  | Project File Infection |                                       | Masquerading              | Remote System Information Discovery | Lateral Tool Transfer           | Data from Local System             |                                     | Block Reporting Message       | Spoof Reporting Message      | Loss of Availability             |
| Internet Accessible Device          | Hooking                   | System Firmware        |                                       | Rootkit                   | Wireless Sniffing                   | Program Download                | Detect Operating Mode              |                                     | Block Serial COM              | Unauthorized Command Message | Loss of Control                  |
| Remote Services                     | Modify Controller Tasking | Valid Accounts         |                                       | Spoof Reporting Message   |                                     | Remote Services                 | I/O Image                          |                                     | Change Credential             |                              | Loss of Productivity and Revenue |
| Replication Through Removable Media | Native API                |                        |                                       |                           |                                     | Valid Accounts                  | Monitor Process State              |                                     | Data Destruction              |                              | Loss of Protection               |
| Rogue Master                        | Scripting                 |                        |                                       |                           |                                     |                                 | Point & Tag Identification         |                                     | Denial of Service             |                              | Loss of Safety                   |
| Spearphishing Attachment            | User Execution            |                        |                                       |                           |                                     |                                 | Program Upload                     |                                     | Device Restart/Shutdown       |                              | Loss of View                     |
| Supply Chain Compromise             |                           |                        |                                       |                           |                                     |                                 | Screen Capture                     |                                     | Manipulate I/O Image          |                              | Manipulation of Control          |
| Transient Cyber Asset               |                           |                        |                                       |                           |                                     |                                 | Wireless Sniffing                  |                                     | Modify Alarm Settings         |                              | Manipulation of View             |
| Wireless Compromise                 |                           |                        |                                       |                           |                                     |                                 |                                    |                                     | Rootkit                       |                              | Theft of Operational Information |
|                                     |                           |                        |                                       |                           |                                     |                                 |                                    |                                     | Service Stop                  |                              |                                  |
|                                     |                           |                        |                                       |                           |                                     |                                 |                                    |                                     | System Firmware               |                              |                                  |

# Contact



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The background of the slide features a blurred image of the Texas state flag on the left and a close-up of a wind turbine's hub and blades on the right. The blades are white with red tips. A dark blue rounded rectangle is centered over the image.

# Questions?



**TEXAS RE**

Ensuring electric reliability for Texans